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Abstract
Cooperative behaviors are defined as the production of common goods benefit-
ting all members of the community at the producer’s cost. They could seem to
be in contradiction with natural selection, as non-cooperators have an increased
fitness compared to cooperators. Understanding the emergence of cooperation
has necessitated the development of concepts and models (inclusive fitness, mul-
tilevel selection, ...) attributing deterministic advantages to this behavior. In
contrast to these models, we show here that cooperative behaviors can emerge by
taking into account only the stochastic nature of evolutionary dynamics: when
cooperative behaviors increase the population size, they also increase the genetic
drift against non-cooperators. Using the Wright-Fisher models of population ge-
netics, we compute exactly this increased genetic drift and its consequences on
the fixation probability of both types of individuals. This computation leads to
a simple criterion: cooperative behavior dominates when the relative increase
in population size caused by cooperators is higher than the selection pressure
against them. This is a purely stochastic effect with no deterministic interpre-
tation.
Keywords: Fixation probability, variable size population, altruism,
non-deterministic
1. Introduction.
One form of cooperative behaviors can be defined as the production of a
common good by an individual that benefits everybody in the community. Such
behavior has a cost in terms of fitness, as the producer devotes part of its re-
sources to this task. To early evolutionary biologists, cooperative behaviors
seemed to be in contradiction with natural selection[1, 2]: since selection acts
on individuals, a non-cooperator has a higher fitness than a cooperator and
will always invade the community. Cooperative behaviors however, specially
in microbial world, are widespread. A few examples of such behaviors are
light production in Vibrio fisheri [3], siderophore production in Pseudomonas
aeroguinosa[4, 5], stalk formation by Dictyostelium discoidum[6, 7], decreased
virulence in many pathogen-host systems[8]. All these cases are examples of a
production of common good by an individual benefiting every individual in the
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community. More generally, these behaviors can be seen as particular cases of
Niche Construction[9].
Researchers have investigated the deterministic advantages that these kinds
of behaviors could confer on individuals. The major schools along this line of in-
vestigation are inclusive fitness[10, 11, 12] and multilevel selection[13, 14, 15, 16]
and their associated variants[17], although the relative merits of these concepts
are sometimes hotly debated [18, 19, 20]. These models have been extended to
take into account finite size populations and stochastic effects. However, the
emergence of cooperative behavior in these model is due to deterministic ad-
vantages (see the Discussion section). Throughout this article, “deterministic
advantages” refers to factors which affects the fitness of an individual ; “deter-
ministic formulation” refers to models where fluctuations are neglected and a
simple differential equation (such as 1) is used to describe the dynamics of the
population.
The aim of this article is not to discuss the relevance of these models, which
have been documented in a large number of books and articles. The fact that
cooperative behaviors are so widespread, however, behooves us to search for
simple mechanisms to explain their emergence. I intend in this article to show
that cooperative behaviors, by the simple act of increasing the population size,
give an advantage to cooperators. The origin of this advantage is not determin-
istic, but has to be sought in the stochasticity of evolutionary dynamics. Note
that the counterintuitive effect of stochasticity (favoring the a priori disadvan-
taged type) has been shown in spatially extended populations [21, 22, 23, 24],
where space is supposed to play the crucial role [21]. We show in this paper
that this phenomenon can take place even in well mixed populations and space
plays then the role of an amplification factor (see Discussion section).
Evolution is an interplay between deterministic causes broadly called fitness,
and random events such as sampling between generations. An advantageous
mutant does not spread with certainty but has only a greater probability of
invading the community and of being fixed. This probability, called the fixation
probability, is the relevant quantity to weight deterministic versus stochastic
causes[25].
Consider an asexual population of fixed size N , with two types of individ-
uals A and S, where S types have a constant positive excess relative fitness s
compared to A. The deterministic differential equation describing the variation
of the proportion x = NA/N of the A type is[26]:
dx/dt = −sx(1− x) (1)
and leads to the disappearance of A individuals (x→ 0).
Going beyond the deterministic approach, one can solve the full stochastic
dynamics of such a model and extract the invasion capacity of these two types,
i.e. the fixation probability pii1 of one individual of type i introduced into a
population consisting entirely of the other type. In the framework of the Wright-
Fisher, for a population of fixed size N , in the small selection pressure limit
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Ns 1 ( see [26] and the exact derivations in equation (10) ):
piA1 =
1
N
− s (2)
piS1 =
1
N
+ s (3)
Therefore, if s > 0 then piS1 > pi
A
1 and type S individuals have a higher invasion
capacity than type A individuals. In this case, the ratio of invasion capacities
has the same information content as the deterministic approach: both lead to
the conclusion that s > 0 favors the S type. The equivalence between these
two approaches has led researchers to investigate the existence of determinis-
tic advantages that could favor the cooperators (A individuals) against non-
cooperators (S individuals) even though s, the bare fitness of S (or equivalently,
the cost of altruism to A) is positive.
Fluctuations and random events can however be more subtle and alter the
equivalence between deterministic and stochastic modeling. In particular, we
can have piS1 < pi
A
1 even when s > 0, without any hidden deterministic advan-
tage. This is the case of a cooperative behavior that increases the population
size.
Biologically, the dependence of population size on the number of coopera-
tors happens for example in situations where individuals compete for limited
resources and two strategies are possible: an economic use of the resources lead-
ing to high population size but low growth rate or a dispendious use of resources
leading to high growth rate but low population size (known as “the tragedy of
the common”[27]). In the microbial word, this phenomenon (called high yield
versus high rate) is common where individuals can have two strategies, for ex-
ample for ATP synthesis (respiration versus fermentation in yeast)[28, 29, 30]
and competition in biofilms where a high yield mutant give rise to larger biofilm,
even though it has a lower growth rate [31]. Rainey and Rainey[32] have studied
another case, where the production of a polymeric molecule by the cooperator
type leads to large decrease in growth rate but higher densities.
A similar observation was performed by Chuang et al. in an engineered
microbial system [33] where two type of bacteria were competing in an antibi-
otic containing media. One type (called producers, i.e. cooperators, A ) was
designed to produce an anti-biotic resistance molecule ; the resources used to
produce this molecule would reduce the growth rate (fitness) of this type. The
other type of bacteria (called non producers, i.e. non cooperators, S) was de-
signed not to produce the antibiotic resistance molecule and would therefore
have a higher growth rate compared to producers. The common good in this
case is the anti-biotic resistance molecule. In a culture composed only of the S
type, no common good is available and the population reaches a low density. In
a population composed only of A type, the common good is abundant and the
population reaches a high density. In a mixed population, the final population
density would reach an intermediate level. However, because non producers
have a higher relative growth rate, they always increase their proportion during
one growth cycle.
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Figure 1: (Color online) Scheme of a cooperative behavior where the population size N of the
habitat is an increasing function of the proportion x of type A individuals : N = N(x). For a
habitat formed of only S type individuals, N(0) = Ni. When only A individuals are present,
N(1) = Nf , where Nf > Ni. The invasion capacity of each type is defined as the fixation
probability of one i type introduced into a community formed only of type j.
Consider a system where the population size is a function of the proportion
of cooperators, varying between Ni when only S type is present and Nf where
only A type is present, with Ni < Nf (figure 1). We suppose that S types have
a constant excess relative fitness s > 0. The deterministic equation (1) does
not change and will again lead to the A’s extinction. The stochastic dynamic
however can be different. When one A mutant is introduced in a population
of S, the initial population size is Ni; on the other hand, when one S type
is introduced in a population of A, the initial population size is Nf . Using
expressions (2,3) as a back of the envelope estimation of the invasion capacity
of both types therefore yields (an exact derivation is given in the following
section):
piA1 =
1
Ni
− s (4)
piS1 =
1
Nf
+ s (5)
We observe that we can have piS1 < pi
A
1 even though s > 0, if
2s <
1
Ni
− 1
Nf
If the selection pressure against cooperators is smaller than the relative varia-
tion in the population size due to cooperators, then the latter type is favored
and has a higher invasion capacity. This is a purely stochastic effect with no
deterministic counterpart and is due to the fact that cooperators increase the
genetic drift of non-cooperators.
We had previously shown the existence of this effect using a two dimen-
sional Markov chain approach of a generalized Moran model[34]. This approach
4
however is mathematically intricate and only approximate solutions could be
obtained at small selection pressure. The effect however can be understood
in a much simpler way using a classical Wright-Fisher (WF) model of popu-
lation genetics, which I develop in the following sections, where very general
results can be obtained. The WF model is a well studied generic model of pop-
ulation genetics, shown to be equivalent to many other models of population
genetics[35].
The article is organized as follow. In the Theory section, I recall the key
points of the classical WF model. In the Result section, first a simple system
is considered where the population size is a linear function of the proportion of
cooperators. An exact solution for the fixation probabilities is then obtained
and it is shown that cooperators can have a higher invasion capacities than
non-cooperators, even when the cost of cooperation is always positive. The
next subsection generalizes this concept to arbitrary dependence of the popula-
tion size on the proportion of cooperators; a very simple and general criterion
is then obtained for cooperators to prevail. Finally, the extension to diploid
populations is considered in the following subsection. The conclusion section
put these results into perspective in respect to other models of the emergence
of cooperation.
2. Methods.
The stochastic simulations follow precisely the described model (eq.14). (i)
Given two numbers nA and nS representing the number of A and S at a given
generation, the program computes x = nA/(nA + nS), u = u(x) according to
equation (6) and N = N(x) according to equation (16). A binomial random
number generator is then used to find n′A and n
′
S = N−n′A in the next generation
according to equation (14). (ii) Beginning with a given number of nA and nS at
first generation, the program generates one random path by iterating the above
process until either nA or nS reaches zero. (iii) M such paths are generated and
the fixation probability pi(x) of A individuals is computed from the proportion
of paths for which nS = 0. Usually, M = 10
8 paths are used to compute the
fixation probability for a given x. (iv) The initial proportion x is varied between
0 to 1 to compute the function pi(x). The numerical simulation, written in C++,
is performed on a 64-core computer.
3. Theory.
I recall the main results of the classical Wright-Fisher model for the sake
of clarity of the following sections. In a community of fixed size N , two types
of asexual adult individuals A and S of abundance nA and nS (nA + nS = N)
produce progeny. This progeny is then sampled to form the next generation of
adults. The sampling process is biased toward the S type which has an excess
relative fitness s which we suppose to be small (0 < s 1).
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The transition probability to have k individuals of type A in the next gen-
eration Gi+1 when nA individuals were present at generation Gi is binomial
[36, 26]:
P (k|nA) =
(
N
k
)
uk(1− u)N−k
where
u =
x
x+ (1 + s)(1− x) (6)
= x− sx(1 − x) +O(s2) (7)
In the above expression, x = nA/N designates the proportion of A in Gi. The
bias s toward the selection of one type can be due to the increase in mean
number of progeny, the variability in their production[37, 35], or any other
similar phenomena.
The exact dynamics of the above stochastic process is not known, but one
can resort to the diffusion approximation [38, 26] to compute various quantities
of interest. This computation is based on the change in the mean and variance
of the proportion of A types in the next generation, which, to the first order in
s is:
a(x) = 〈y|x〉 − x = −sx(1− x) (8)
b(x) =
1
2
Var(y|x) = 1
2N
x(1− x) (9)
where y is the proportion of A in the next generation; 〈y|x〉 designates the
expectation of y conditioned on x, the proportion of A in the present generation.
The fixation probability pi(x) of the A type present with proportion x at the
first generation can be computed from the backward diffusion approximation of
stochastic dynamics[38] :
a(x)
dpi(x)
dx
+ b(x)
d2pi(x)
dx2
= 0 (10)
As −a(x)/b(x) = 2Ns, the use of boundary conditions pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1 leads
to the well known Kimura solution:
pi(x) =
1− e2Nsx
1− e2Ns (11)
≈ x−Nsx(1 − x) for Ns 1 (12)
The invasion capacity of both types are readily obtained from the above expres-
sion
piA1 = pi(1/N) ; pi
S
1 = 1− pi(1− 1/N)
and are equal to expressions (2,3) in the small selection pressure limit Ns 1.
The ratio of invasion capacities reads
RSA =
piS1
piA1
=
1 +Ns
1−Ns ≈ 1 + 2Ns (13)
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Figure 2: (Color online) Scheme of sampling between generations in the present model : The
population size Ni+1 of generation Gi+1 is a function of the number of cooperators nA,i
present at generation Gi : Ni+1 = N(nA). The selection process consists in selecting Ni+1
individuals among the progeny at Gi.
and RSA > 1 if s > 0. Note that here we use s as the relative excess advantage
of the S type, or equivalently, the cost of A type. Hence the change in the sign
of s in expression (11) compared to similar expressions used in the literature.
The reason behind this choice is that in the following, A will designates the
cooperators with a positive cost for cooperation.
4. Results.
4.1. Variable size population.
Consider now a system in which the population size is not constant, but is an
increasing function of the number of cooperators nA(figure 1). The stochastic
behavior of such a system can be modelled as follow: as in the fixed size habitat
before, both A and S types at generation Gi produce progeny ; however, the
population size Ni+1 of the next generation Gi+1 depends on the number (or
proportion) of cooperators in Gi. Hence Ni+1 = N(nA,i) individuals among
the progeny are randomly selected to form the next generation (figure 2). The
probability of having k individuals of type A in generation Gi+1, knowing that
there were nA,i individuals at generation Gi is binomial :
P (k|nA,i) =
(
Ni+1
k
)
uk(1− u)Ni+1−k (14)
where u has the same definition as in (6). We can repeat all the arguments for
the computation of relative change in the mean and variance of the proportion
x = nA/N of A types, keeping in mind that the only difference in the present
model is that N = N(x) is no longer constant. In particular, the fixation
probabilities are given by the same backward diffusion equation
a(x)
dpi(x)
dx
+ b(x)
d2pi(x)
dx2
= 0 (15)
where this time,
−a(x)
b(x)
= 2sN(x)
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For the sake of simplicity, in this subsection we suppose a linear form for N(x)
(figure 1):
N(x) = (1− x)Ni + xNf (16)
where Nf and Ni (Ni < Nf) are the carrying capacities of the habitat when
composed only of A types and S type. The next subsection generalizes the
computation to arbitrary form of N(x).
Let us first consider the trivial case of s = 0, i.e. a cooperative behavior
which increases the population size without any cost to A, the producers of the
common good. In this case, a(x) = 0 and the solution of eq.(15), taking into
account the boundary conditions is given by pi(x) = x. The invasion capacities
of A and S is therefore
piA1 = pi(x = 1/Ni) = 1/Ni
piS1 = 1− pi(x = 1− 1/Nf) = 1/Nf
and piA1 > pi
S
1 . This case illustrates the clear advantage of the cooperator type
A and the stochastic cost to non-cooperators in the form of increased genetic
drift. Note that the deterministic equation dx/dt = a(x) cannot predict this
outcome.
When s > 0, the stochastic advantage of A types is reduced, but can persist
up to some value smax which we compute below. The differential equation (15)
can still be easily solved. Let us express Ni and Nf in terms of their mean and
relative difference
N¯ = (Nf +Ni)/2 (17)
2δ = (Nf −Ni)/N¯ (18)
Then, setting
ψ(x) = 2N¯sx (1− δ + δx)
we have
dpi
dx
= C exp (ψ(x)) (19)
Integrating once more and taking into account the boundary conditions piA(0) =
0, piA(1) = 1, the solution can be written as
pi(x) =
f(0)− f(x)
f(0)− f(1) (20)
where
f(x) =
e2N¯s((1−δ)x+δx
2)
√
2N¯sδ
D
(√
N¯s
2δ
(1− δ + 2δx)
)
and
D(z) = e−z
2
ˆ z
0
eu
2
du
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Figure 3: (Color online) Numerical computation of pi(x) and its comparison with theoretical
values for Ni = 90, Nf = 110 and s = (1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100) × 10
−4. The arrow indicates
the direction of increasing s. For each value of initial proportion of A individuals x ∈ [0, 1], a
random discrete path is generated by determining the population size in the next generation
according to relation (16) and then sampling of the present generation to constitute the
next generation according to relation (14); the process is stopped by the loss of either A
or S individuals. 108 such paths are generated to compute, for each initial proportion x,
its fixation probability pi(x). Symbols : values obtained from numerical simulations ; solid
lines : theoretical values according to expression (20) ; dashed lines : small selection pressure
approximation (eq. 21).
is the Dawson function. Note that for δ → 0; the above expression for fixation
probability converges to the expression (11) for fixed population size. In the
case of small selection pressure against A (N¯s  1) and small relative change
in the size of the habitat δ  1, expanding the fixation probability (20) to the
second order in N¯s and δ, we find
pi(x) ≈ x− N¯sx(1− x) + N¯s
3
(N¯s+ δ)x(1 − x)(1− 2x). (21)
Note that this limit could have been obtained by direct integration of the power
series expansion of exp (ψ(x)) in expression (19). Direct integration of power
series allows more complicated laws of population size N(x) to be taken into
account, when exact solutions are no longer available.
Figure 3 shows the excellent agreement between numerical simulations of the
above stochastic process and the theoretical predictions (eqs. 20,21).
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Let us now compute the invasion capacity of each type by keeping only the
first order terms:
piA1 = pi
(
1
Ni
)
≈ 1
Ni
− N¯
Ni
s
piS1 = 1− pi
(
1− 1
Nf
)
≈ 1
Nf
+
N¯
Nf
s
The ratio of invasion capacities now becomes:
RSA =
piS1
piA1
=
(
1− δ
1 + δ
)(
1 + N¯s
1− N¯s
)
(22)
≈ 1 + 2N¯s− 2δ (23)
We see that, contrary to the fixed population size case (eq. 13), we can have
RSA < 1 even when s > 0 ! The criterion for cooperators to prevail is simply
δ > N¯s (24)
Figure 4 shows the excellent agreement between RSA obtained from numerical
results and the theoretical prediction (eq. 20). Note that for large δ, the criterion
(24) underestimates the advantage of A individuals, which can prevail at a
higher cost of cooperation. The general form of the criterion is given in the next
subsection
Let us stress again that the A type advantage is due purely to the stochas-
ticity of natural selection and has no deterministic interpretation. It is due to
the interplay between genetic drift and deterministic effect. The deterministic
equation, neglecting fluctuations, is as before
dx
dt
= a(x) = −sx(1− x)
and predicts the disappearance of A individuals that have a negative relative
excess fitness.
4.2. Solution for general form of N(x) and s(x).
The conditions necessary for RSA < 1 can be obtained for any form of N(x)
without computing pi(x) explicitly. First, note that the first integral of the
Kimura equation (15) is
log
(
pi′(x)
pi′(0)
)
= −
ˆ x
0
a(u)
b(u)
du
= 2s
ˆ x
0
N(u)du
The invasion capacities can be expressed in terms of the function pi′(x) :
piA1 = pi(1/Ni) = pi
′(0)(1/Ni) +O(1/N2i )
piS1 = 1− pi(1 − 1/Nf) = pi′(1)(1/Nf) +O(1/N2f )
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Figure 4: (Color online) Logarithm of the ratio of invasion capacities RSA = pi
S
1
/piA
1
as a func-
tion of selection pressure N¯s for N¯ = 100 and increasing value of δ = 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
(a-f). Symbols : fixation probability ratio obtained from numerical simulations as detailed in
figure 3; solid lines : theoretical predictions of fixation probabilities obtained from eq. (20) ;
dashed lines : general solution given by relation (25).
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because of the boundary conditions pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1. Therefore, to the
first order in 1/N , the ratio of invasion capacities is:
RSA =
piS1
piA1
=
pi′(1)
pi′(0)
Ni
Nf
and therefore
log (RSA) = 2s
ˆ 1
0
N(u)du+ log (Ni/Nf ) (25)
The condition for A to prevail,i.e. RSA < 1, is then equivalent to
2s
ˆ 1
0
N(u)du < log (Nf/Ni) (26)
For the simple case investigated in the preceding subsection, in which N(x) =
N¯(1 − δ + 2δx) the left hand side of relation (26) evaluates to 2N¯s and the
criterion becomes
2N¯s < log
(
1 + δ
1− δ
)
= log
(
Nf
Ni
)
(27)
which reduces to expression (24) for small δ, as log[(1 + δ)/(1 − δ)] ≈ 2δ. The
above criterion states again that when the selection pressure against the co-
operators is less than the relative change in population size, cooperators are
favored.
The accuracy of this criterion, for the case of linear N(x), is shown in figure
4. The general criterion (26) is not limited to small selection pressure or small
variation in population size. The condition N  1 is still necessary for the
validity of the diffusion approximation[39].
The present article was restricted until now to the case where the cost of
altruism s was constant. This is the case for example of light production in V.
fisheri : bacteria engaging in light production decrease their growth rate, and
non-cooperator mutants gain a fixed increased fitness compared to them[40]. In
many situations however, this is a to restrictive hypothesis as the availability
of the common good would in principle diminish the fitness difference between
producers and non-producers of the common good. For example, when the cost
of producing the common good for an individual is constant (C) but the benefit
received from others depend on the number of producers Bx. The overall cost of
altruism will then be s(x) = C−Bx. Therefore, in general, the cost of altruism
should be considered to depend on the proportion of altruists, i.e. s = s(x),
and the cost would be a decreasing function of the proportion of altruists. The
precise measurement of s(x) is best performed in experiments with bacterial
colonies[33, 41, 29].
The restriction to constant s can easily be relaxed and the above compu-
tations and the criteria (26) can be generalized to the case where s = s(x).
Repeating the above computations for this case, the criterion for A to prevail
becomes
2
ˆ 1
0
s(u)N(u)du < log (Nf/Ni) (28)
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The case s constant is the “worst case” scenario, showing that even in this case,
altruists can emerge by simple genetic drift and varying population size. If s(x)
is a decreasing function of x, then obviously
´ 1
0 s(u)N(u)du < s(0)
´ 1
0 N(u)du
and the emergence of altruists is favored even more. In the specific case where
s(x) changes its sign (as it is supposed in many frequency-dependent mod-
els), altruists can emerge even for constant size populations Ni = Nf = N if´ 1
0
s(u)du < 0.
4.3. Extension to diploid populations.
The above results can be generalized to diploid, randomly mating popula-
tions when cooperative behavior is caused by a single gene. Consider a diploid
population of size N corresponding to 2N gametes. The fitness of (AA,AS, SS)
individuals will be denoted (1, 1 + s(1/2 − ), 1 + s) where s, as before is the
relative fitness value of the allele S and  ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] is the dominance of
allele A ;  = 0 corresponds to no dominance. As before, x will designate the
frequency of allele A. Following the arguments of the previous sections, we can
write the number of A allele in the next generation as
P (k|nA,i) =
(
2Ni+1
k
)
uk(1− u)2Ni+1−k
where [26]
u =
x2 + (1 + s(1/2− ))x(1 − x)
x2 + 2(1 + s(1/2− ))x(1 − x) + (1 + s)(1− x)2
= x− sx(1 − x)(1 + 2− 4x) +O(s2)
For the population size, we will use a generalization of relation (16) :
N2
N¯2
= (1 − δ + 2δx)2 + 2δx(1− x)
where N¯ and δ were defined in (17,18). This relation reduces to (16) when  = 0
and ensures that N = N¯ = const when δ = 0.
Repeating the computations of the previous section in the regime where
N¯s 1 and δ  1, and keeping the lowest order terms leads to
pi(x) = x− 2N¯sx(1 − x)
(
1 +
2
3
(1− 2x)
)
from which we can compute the ratio of invasion capacities RSA = pi
S
1 /pi
A
1 :
RSA =
(
1− δ
1 + δ
)(
1 + 2N¯s(1− 2/3)
1− 2N¯s(1 + 2/3)
)
≈ 1 + 4N¯s− 2δ
The simplest diploid case (random mating, no linkage disequilibrium) is similar
to the haploid case and the criterion for cooperators to prevail does not change.
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5. Discussion and Conclusion.
The problem of the emergence of cooperative behaviors and “altruism” has
been a conundrum in evolutionary biology and has attracted a very large num-
ber of contributions from different fields. We have shown in this article that this
conundrum may not exist at all, if we shift our attention from deterministic ad-
vantages to fluctuation induced advantages. The original Wright-Fisher model,
developed in the 20’s, clarified the concepts of stochasticity in population ge-
netics and showed that a mutant, even when deleterious, has some probability
of invading the community, i.e. piA1 > 0. We have, in this article, extended this
concept by showing that it is even possible for the deleterious mutant to have a
higher invasion capacity than the wild type, i.e. piA1 > pi
S
1 . This is based on the
fact that purely fluctuation induced advantages can overcome the disadvantages
and the cost of cooperative behaviors if the relative increase in the population
size induced by cooperators is higher than the cost of altruism. This demon-
stration has been achieved by the use of the generic Wright-Fisher model, which
captures in very simple terms the combined effects of finite size populations and
deterministic advantages.
All the existing models of cooperation (kin/multilevel/reciprocity/...) have
also been extended to finite populations in order to take into account the im-
portance of fluctuations . The important point to stress is that in these models,
there are always deterministic advantages associated with cooperation. In other
terms, the deterministic drift term a(x) changes its sign for some x ∈]0, 1[ and
has more than two zeros. Therefore, the deterministic equation for the propor-
tion of A,
dx/dt = a(x)
has more than one stable point, one of which corresponds to the dominance of A
types. For example, the replicator dynamics used in the context of evolutionary
game theories uses[42, 43]
a(x) = x(1 − x) (Ax+B(1− x))
and for A > 0, B < 0 and B/(B − A) ∈ [0, 1], the dynamics possesses two
stable points x = 0 and x = 1. Taking into account fluctuations and finite
size populations then helps to explain how a single A mutant can emerge and
dominate the habitat[44, 45]. The same kind of arguments can be made for
multilevel selection theories, where the deterministic models already explain
the possibility for the existence of cooperators[15] and then the computation
can be extended to take into account fluctuations[46].
Natural populations are geographically extended and the addition of space
to the evolutionary dynamics introduces new features. Van Baleen and Rand
[21], using a moment closure approximation for spatially extended population,
have argued that altruistic behaviors can emerge due to the stochasticity of
the evolutionary dynamics even when the deterministic equations predict their
disappearance. The various extensions/generalizations of their work has been
reviewed by Lehman and Rousset [47]. Perc[23] has considered the case of spa-
tially extended population of defectors and cooperators in the context of game
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dynamics, and has shown that the addition of some amount of randomness to the
payoff of different strategies can reverse the direction of the game: cooperators
can reach a substantial proportion of the total population, even though their
extinction is predicted from a deterministic formulation of the game. A similar
phenomenon happens when the randomness in payoff is spatially distributed
[24] and various extension of these models are reviewed in [48].
In the case of varying population size, the addition of space can have an
amplifying effect on the stochastic advantage of the A type discussed here. It
can indeed by shown that at low migration rate, the invasion capacity of S type
mutant tend toward zero, while the invasion capacity of the A type remain fi-
nite [34]. A similar result was obtained by Hallatschek[49] when investigating
the dynamics of Fisher waves for varying population size. These results were
obtained for populations subdivided into patches and exchanging migrants be-
tween them. An extension of the present work would be to derive these results
for continuously distributed populations and obtain a consistent expression for
the effective population size N¯e of spatially structured populations in the context
of cooperative behaviors.
To summarize, in the model we present in this article, there is no determinis-
tic advantages associated with cooperations and a(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The
only driving force in the present model is provided by fluctuations due to finite
size populations. The key point, which we have demonstrated in the preceding
sections, is that the invasion capacity piA1 of the cooperators can be higher than
the invasion capacity of defectors piS1 , even when the cost of cooperation s is
always positive and the deterministic approach leads to the extinction of the A
types.
The aim of this article is not to contest the merits of existing models such
as kin or multilevel selection, which have been investigated during the last forty
years with a large number of case studies. I propose an alternative approach to
the problem of cooperation, that is complimentary to the existing models and
which restores the key ingredients of population genetics to this field.
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